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Introduction 
 
Society … becomes a partnership not 
only between those who are living, but 
between those who are living, those who 
are dead and those who are to be born. 
Edmund Burke, 1790/2005: 54  
 
Today when biologists contemplate 
morality, they are as likely as not to believe 
that human morality or ethical thinking 
either needs to be, or can be explained 
biologically. It is the kind of sentiment on 
offer in middlebrow journals like The 
Economist when it asked: 
  
Whence morality? That is a question 
which has troubled philosophers since 
their subject was invented. Two and a 
half millennia of debate have, however, 
failed to produce a satisfactory answer. 
So now it is time for someone else to have 
a go … Perhaps [biologists] can 
eventually do what philosophers have 
never managed, and explain moral 
behavior in an intellectually satisfying 
way.  
(The Economist, 21st Feb. 2008) 
 
Contemporary adherents of socio-biology 
like Jasper Ridley, Richard Dawkins and 
Sam Harris take something E.O. Wilson said 
over three decades ago seriously, when he 
suggested that the time has come for ethics 
to be removed temporarily from the hands of 
the philosophers and biologicized (Wilson 
1975: 562). As Hall (2010) notes, this has 
merit as there may well be important 
discoveries to be made or insights gained 
that help to explain why humans engage in 
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ethical conduct. Yet the reference by The 
Economist to ‘explaining moral behaviour’ 
points to the way the modern socio-
biological frame consistently muddles the 
questions that matter.   
 
The contemporary pursuit by socio-
biologists of an explanation for why humans 
have moral ideas is essentially irrelevant to 
various western ethical traditions like 
‘Judaeo-Christianity’, virtue ethics, deontic 
ethics, and utilitarianism. Occasionally, 
members of the various western ethical 
traditions have asked where does human 
ethical practice ‘come from’.  Over several 
thousand years various explanations have 
been offered ranging from ‘God’, through 
communal values (e.g., Hegel’s sittlichkeit), 
to Bentham’s account of rational self-
interest. Yet we need to acknowledge how 
advocates for the variety of rival versions of 
moral inquiry from Socrates, Plato and 
Aristotle through St Thomas Aquinas, 
Spinoza, Bentham, Kant, Mill or Nussbaum 
have all engaged in a project designed to 
tease out the core elements of practical 
reasoning. Practical reasoning takes as its 
central question the core question of human 
practice: What ought I (or we) do?  The 
archive of the western ethical traditions 
offers us a treasure trove of ideas, styles of 
reasoning and guides to good conduct.  
 
That exercise is far removed from the 
modern socio-biologist project. This is 
exemplified when Harris et al. (2009) argue 
that the use of fMRI machines identifies the 
material substrata of ethical decision-making 
processes. Harris (2010) goes further, 
claiming that evolutionary neuro-science 
will actually start to guide our practical 
choices and that science can determine 
human values. This is a reductionist and 
narrowly ‘rationalistic’ exercise designed to 
show how human affairs in general, and 
ethical thinking in particular, is essentially 
the product of objectively observable, 
measurable and predictable evolutionary 
and/or neurological structures or processes. 
Tallis (2011) demonstrates how this makes 
fundamental mistakes or relies on quite 
basic logical fallacies.  The net effect of this 
neuro-scientific project is to convert rational 
inquiry into what we ought to do, into a 
deterministic and reductionist account of 
ethical thought represented as a consequence 
of physiological processes. Just one of the 
fallacies being perpetrated is illustrated by 
the analogical proposition that we somehow  
‘explain’ the thought or beauty of a 
Shakespearean sonnet we are reading on a 
laptop, only when we can identify ‘its’ 
presence in a sequence of electrical pulses in 
the microprocessor or else in the circuits of 
the microprocessor. None of the possible 
explanatory relationships (of causality, 
correlation or identity) are at play here; just 
plain old muddled thinking (Tallis, 2011).   
 
Yet this does not mean that there is no 
connection between ethics and biology. 
Rather we just need to get that relationship 
right. In effect rather than biologicize ethics, 
we need to ensure that biological science 
understands its ethical obligations to life. 
We argue here that the current relationship 
between biology and ethics needs to be 
redefined, and that biologists need to be both 
more thoughtful and clearer about their 
moral ideas about the value of life in all of 
its forms.    
 
This paper has been written essentially for 
an audience of practicing biologists or life 
scientists, mindful of the continued salience 
of what C.P. Snow (1959) called the ‘two 
cultures problem’. In it we engage in a 
translation exercise to suggest why this large 
community of scientists might want to more 
consciously draw on a tradition of 
environmental ethics that has been evolving 
since the late 1920s (Jahr, 1927).  In 
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particular it spells out why an ethical 
framework based on a conception of the 
intrinsic value of life leads rationally to 
certain ethical obligations that constitute an 
ethical biology.  We then make the case for 
an intergenerational approach to securing 
the future of the biosphere. We start by first 
clarifying the nature of the ethical.   
 
What is ethical? 
In a striking intervention Emanuel Levinas 
derives the primacy of ethics from the 
experience of the encounter with the Other.  
Levinas concludes that it is only in the 
presence of another person [the Other] that 
the horizons of our ethical obligations 
become clear (Levinas, 1961). He is worried 
about the rationality of any enquiry, in this 
case, into ethical matters and noted that 
everyone will readily agree that it is of the 
highest importance to know whether we are 
duped or not by morality (Levinas, 1961).  
Our sense of self or our subjectivity, Levinas 
argued, is primordially ethical, not 
theoretical: that is to say, our responsibility 
for the other is not a derivative feature of 
our subjectivity, but instead, constitutes our 
sense of being a particular kind of person in 
the world by giving it a meaningful direction 
and orientation. Levinas' account of an 
‘ethics as first philosophy’ means that the 
traditional philosophical pursuit of 
knowledge is secondary to a basic ethical 
duty to the other. For Levinas, the 
irreducible relation, the epiphany of the 
encounter with another is a privileged 
phenomenon:  The Other precisely reveals 
himself in his alterity [otherness] not in a 
shock negating the I, but as the primordial 
phenomenon of gentleness.  Levinas clearly 
intends that ‘the Other’ he has in mind 
applies to other humans.  However, do other 
life forms constitute such an Other?  
 
Here we confront the long-standing 
anthropocentric or human-centered 
dispositions of western ethical thought. Our 
ethical perspectives either assign intrinsic 
value to human beings alone (which is a 
robust form of anthropocentrism) or else 
insist that humans have more important 
needs than other life forms, such that 
promoting human interests or well-being at 
the expense of nonhuman things is almost 
always justified – which is a weak 
anthropocentrism. Further, where the older 
western traditions have thought about ethical 
issues affecting non-human life it tended to 
value things simply as means to further 
some other ends, rather than to value things 
as ends in themselves.  Conventional 
western ethical thinkers have had trouble 
saying what is wrong with the cruel 
treatment of nonhuman animals or why, 
except to the extent that such treatment may 
lead to bad consequences for human beings, 
which is to say there is a pervasive 
instrumentalism at work: Kant (1963) 
suggests that by being persistently cruel 
towards a dog might encourage development 
of a character which would be desensitized 
to cruelty towards humans. From this 
standpoint, cruelty towards nonhuman 
animals would be instrumentally, rather than 
intrinsically, wrong.   
 
It is a truism that biology is the study (or 
logia- ?????) of life (bios – ???).  To make 
the case for an ethical biology is to 
understand that one core question about the 
study of life is this: what is the value of life 
– in all of its dimensions and forms? 
 
In light of the current interest in finding 
intelligent extra-terrestrial life, Paul Davies 
(2011) makes the point that for all intents 
and purposes, the nature of life on our planet 
is unique. Using a Bayesian probabilistic 
analytic frame, Spiegel and Turner (2011:1) 
sensibly conclude given the absolute 
absence of evidence of life anywhere else in 
the universe that there is an arbitrarily low 
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intrinsic probability of abiogenesis for 
plausible uninformative priors. That is, 
given the complete absence of any evidence 
to the contrary, the probability that there is 
another planet ‘out there’ with intelligent 
life on it is not much greater than 0. The 
implication is simple yet striking… the 
splendid variety of life on Earth is both 
unique and of incalculable value. The case 
for an ethical biology rests on this 
proposition.   
 
Yet more is needed than this blank assertion.  
We need to consider the project of 
rationality itself and how a conception of 
justice might become central to modern 
biology.  
 
 
What is rational? 
The idea of rational enquiry has a long and 
complicated history. Scientists working in 
life and physical sciences may be inclined to 
define the scientific method as a progressive 
growth towards truth. This idea was given 
credence by Popper’s (1974) insistence that 
falsificationism was fundamental to good 
science. Yet, the basis of this faith has been 
eroded in the second half of the twentieth 
century, when societies ceased to host any 
significant theoretical or moral consensus 
about the criteria available to assess either 
factual-truth or practical-ethical claims. Not 
surprisingly, Habermas (1996: 97) 
recognises a present-day ‘post-metaphysical 
crisis’ where justification of practices 
‘simply by calling attention to the contexts 
in which they were handed down’ is 
unacceptable. This is evidenced in 
controversy about climate change, genetics 
and the persistent creationist vs. evolutionist 
debate. As Regh (in Habermas 1996: 8) 
notes, this is the problem of dealing with a 
social reality on the one side and a claim of 
reason (which is sometimes belied by the 
reality) on the other.   
As sanctioned by MacIntyre (1990) 
rationality is a project most likely to flourish 
when people enjoy the conditions of 
freedom of enquiry that define a public 
space such as a university.  
 
When it is demanded of a university 
community that it justify itself by specifying 
what its peculiar and essential function is, 
that function which if it were not to exist, no 
other institution could discharge, the 
response of that community ought to be that 
universities are places where conceptions of, 
and standards of rational justification are 
elaborated, put to work in the detailed 
practices of enquiry, and themselves 
rationally evaluated, so that only from a 
university can the wider society  learn how 
to conduct its own debates, theoretical or 
practical in a rationally defensible way.   
 
When this constant process of renewal of the 
capacity for thoughtfulness is nourished and 
sustained, then those who have access to the 
university can engage in those distinctive 
forms of reflexive and deliberative practices 
that define a democracy whose members 
engage in and value active citizenship. This 
formulation while seemingly abstract 
matters deeply. It may facilitate finding 
answers to those perpetual questions that 
affect our capacity to live well (or not so 
well). For this helps us to determine whether 
a course of action is truly a good choice: 
 
… distinctions between the real and 
imaginary, the true and the untrue, the 
good and the bad. Only when such 
distinctions are deeply embedded in the 
processes by which individual and social 
identities are formed is it then possible to 
deal with the ‘real’ world as an array of 
particular social facts and institutions 
such as the state or the economy.  
Hansen (1993)  
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Habermas (1996) argues that rationality 
involves a process of discursive deliberation 
where ethical claims that might inform 
normative conduct can be established to 
arrive at a rational consensus. In 
determining the facts, Habermas has had to 
acknowledge the reality of a world that 
exists and about which truth claims need to 
be made successfully, while accepting as 
Kant did, that we can never have direct 
access to the world without linguistic 
mediation. 
 
As to the nature of the rationality involved, 
Dahlberg (2000: 5) says it is possible to 
formally specify this as ‘communicative 
action’, drawing on a formal method in the 
Kantian sense of attempting to reconstruct 
the conditions of possibility of 
communicative interaction. ‘Understanding’ 
(verstandigung) is central to communicative 
action’. At its most basic level, it simply 
means mutual comprehension, i.e. that 
people are using the same words with the 
same meanings so as to achieve a degree of 
shared meaning and mutual comprehension. 
At its most elevated, ‘understanding’ means 
a shared consensus about the universal 
validity of claims people make to speak the 
truth or to know the good. This 
accomplishment requires that participants 
need to believe that a rationally motivated 
agreement could in principle be achieved 
…provided e.g. that the argumentation 
could be conducted openly enough and 
continued long enough (Habermas, 1984: 
42). 
 
Communicative action firstly requires that 
everyone potentially affected by an activity 
be taken into account (Fultner, 2003). Only 
then can reciprocal testing of problematic 
validity claims be made. Secondly 
communicative action presupposes a formal 
and discursive equality among participants, 
implying that all parties be given equal 
opportunity to make claims and question any 
assertion. Thirdly this entails social equality, 
a lack of which can affect the capacity of 
people to fully participate (Habermas, 1996: 
308).  
 
Communicative action also requires certain 
attitudes. So reflexivity is also a condition, 
for people must be willing to change their 
minds as they critically examine their own 
prejudices and beliefs. Finally Habermas 
(1996: 34) requires that participants in the 
ideal-speech setting will bring good will to 
bear – an assumption of honesty, 
impartiality and respectful listening – to 
seek to understand rather than provoke 
disagreement.  
 
These protocols point to ways of ensuring 
that scientific and ethical discourse might be 
made to work. We also need to consider 
how an ethical biology might make a 
conception of justice central to its practices. 
If we accept that we need to treat the variety 
of life in all its forms on our planet as both 
unique and as possessing inestimable and 
incalculable value, then we may also accept 
that justice is at stake in the relationship 
between the biosphere and ourselves. 
Though there are many relevant conceptions 
of justice, one that deserves attention and 
seems especially relevant to our biosphere is 
intergenerational justice. When deeply 
contemplating justice, we confront the need 
to find a point of ‘reflective equilibrium’ 
between description and evaluation Finnis 
(1980). This requires a descriptive-
evaluative anthropology of the goods which 
inform the good life to be conjoined with a 
capacity to understand what is really good 
for humans and what is necessitated by 
practical reasonableness, i.e. we need also to 
have clarity about the nature of justice.   
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What is justice? 
Perhaps justice is best understood by asking 
the question: What do we owe to each other? 
(Scanlon 2000)   At stake here are two 
issues: who is the ‘we’? And what does the 
idea that we owe something imply? In 
defining ‘we’ it may be asserted that as well 
as the living, the ‘we’ includes those who 
are either dead or who are yet to be born. 
However there is a deep-seated prejudice in 
favour of excluding both these (Feinberg, 
1980; Thompson, 2009). Irrespective of this, 
justice is inter-temporal – we live in time – 
and this is embodied in our legislative 
systems, for justice and lawfulness must 
extend across time, with the relevant 
principles, rules and practices moving from 
the past and into the future. This assumes 
that there is a temporal intentionality with 
the operating principles of justice that will 
extend into the indefinite future. The 
implications of this, especially in the British 
System, are simple: legal rights are routinely 
attributed to persons not yet born.  
 
In light of this there is the presumption that 
until it is amended, any given law that 
regulates the conduct of persons alive and 
future, assumes that the latter have a variety 
of rights and obligations.  Similarly the vast 
body of common law practice and principles 
is assumed to codify rules and principles 
like habeas corpus, the use of juries in 
various kinds of courts and cases, or the 
rules about admissible evidence with 
application out into the future. Subject to the 
proviso that laws may be amended from 
time to time, the premise operating is that 
these basic legal statements are designed and 
intended to operate into the future with the 
clear expectation that rights enunciated in a 
constitution drafted in say 1900, will 
enunciate those rights for generations yet to 
be born. Some, like the Constitution of the 
United States of America (1787), 
specifically state that the document was 
ratified to secure the blessings of liberty to 
ourselves and to posterity. Thus, if legal 
systems have no trouble in conceiving of the 
persons not yet born enjoying the benefits of 
current legislation, it is not clear why some 
philosophers would override this.  
 
Our justice system enshrines obligations 
owed to those who have died, those who are 
alive, and those yet to be born because the 
practice of justice as temporarily 
transformative. However, the presence or 
absence of persons still matters because it 
affects what we can legitimately expect as 
we extend our regard for moral obligations, 
rights and interests beyond the present and 
look backwards and forwards. At stake here 
are the choices open to us about the best 
practice and the goodness of our thinking 
about why we have chosen this or that kind 
of justice. Choosing in this case between the 
kinds of justice we want to enact or practice 
requires uncommon expertise. 
 
Intergenerational justice: obligations to 
the not yet born 
John Rawls’ Theory of Justice marked the 
proper initiation of obligations to future 
generations as a topic of salient 
philosophical interest. More recently, what 
Barry (1977:204) asks reinforces this 
intergenerational quality of justice:  
 
…  can it be said that we should be 
behaving unjustly if we neglected their 
interests in deciding how much to use up 
finite resources, how far to damage the 
environment in ways that are irreversible 
or at any rate extremely expensive to 
reverse, and how much to invest in 
capital goods or research and 
development of new technologies (e.g. 
into non-exhaustible energy sources)?  
 
Intergenerational justice demands that when 
opportunities are denied to future 
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generations because of depletion or other 
irreversible damage to the environment, 
others should be created, even if at some 
cost. There are nonetheless, extraordinary 
difficulties with this idea of 
intergenerational justice. Laslett & Fishkin 
(1992) whilst acknowledging that a good 
deal of political theory has been produced in 
the past (and the present) within the grossly 
simplifying assumptions of a timeless world, 
conclude that: 
 
Principles of justice, equality and utility 
that yield reasonable conclusions for 
fixed population sizes over short periods 
begin to produce bizarre results once 
cohort sizes or total populations sizes or 
both vary over time. The implicit 
contractual relations among generations 
fail for the same reason.  
(Laslett & Fishkin, 1992: 6)  
 
There is however a very real problem of 
knowing precisely whose interests or rights 
we wish to promote among future 
generations. That is, how can you attribute 
rights to people not yet born and who do not 
exist? In light of this, Beckerman (2004) 
argues that any sensible conception of rights 
or justice cannot be applied to persons not 
yet born.   His argument rests on the premise 
that rights are a property, like being green or 
owning something. The flaw in this is the 
fallacy of misplaced concreteness (or 
reification), which involves treating an 
abstraction, in this case rights, as if they are 
a real physical entity or a real event. 
However: 
   
… if that were the case, then neither human 
idiots nor wee babies would have any legal 
rights at all. Yet it is manifest that both of 
these classes of intellectual incompetents 
have legal rights recognized and easily 
enforced by the courts. Children and idiots 
start legal proceedings, not on their own 
direct initiative, but rather through the 
actions of proxies or attorneys who are 
empowered to speak in their names.  
Fienberg (1980: 154) 
 
If there is no problem here why should there 
be in the case where a proxy makes a claim 
on behalf of people who are not yet born? 
 
But there are issues that this objection raises. 
For we cannot hope to fully comprehend the 
cultural values of future generations, 
although it is highly likely that they will 
value ‘health, longevity, liberty, opportunity 
and a sustainable natural environment’. Thus 
the ontic fact is that humans have aims, 
desires and beliefs, many of which which 
transcend the present confers upon them 
their right bearing status (Feinberg 1980).   
 
This is evidenced by a propensity to make a 
will, stating what is to happen to our body 
and our property after our death; and the law 
ensures that posthumous status does not 
abolish our interests or our rights upon 
death. Any action we anticipate arises 
because there is both a legal obligation and a 
moral obligation.  
 
Finally, when considering obligations to the 
unborn we should note that contractarians 
since Rawls (1971: 126-30) have drawn on 
what Rawls called Hume’s ‘circumstances 
of justice’ to deny that we have any. Thus, 
as we have no obligations to such people, 
they cannot be parties to our contract. This 
is because there is no possibility of mutually 
advantageous interaction between those of 
us alive and those who will be born in the 
next millennium. While it can be said that 
the quality of life of future generations 
depends to a very large extent on the 
decisions we take, our quality of life cannot 
be affected at all by the decisions taken by 
people born in 2050. This objection argues 
while we can do a great deal for ‘posterity’,  
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‘posterity’ cannot do anything to (or for) us. 
This was a problem for Rawls who rested 
his contractualism on the pursuit of self-
interest behind the ‘veil of ignorance’.   
 
However, it should be noted that Scanlon’s 
(2000) contractualism bypasses this by 
assuming that all of us are moral agents 
motivated by a desire to justify ourselves to 
others. There is no reason why those others 
need to be people who are currently alive, or 
perhaps even if they are humans. When 
deciding how to act, there is no problem in 
asking whether people born in 2050 will be 
affected by my actions by rejecting the 
principle I am relying on to permit those 
actions. For example, I may want to 
construct a factory that will release low-
level radiation and it seems entirely 
reasonable to ask whether those who will 
suffer as a result in the 2050s might 
reasonably object to my behaviour. Because 
it works with the possibility of reasonable 
rejection - rather than actual bargaining - 
Scanlon’s contractualism easily 
accommodates obligations to future and as 
yet unborn people.   
 
This brings us full circle. We conclude by 
defining a moral imperative that places 
humans a part of (rather than apart from) 
nature, for it is evident that we have 
obligations to future generations, and it 
follows that we have an obligation to not 
irreversibly compromise their environment 
(Buckeridge, 2012). Thus the consideration 
to be adopted in any working model for 
resource management must be that in 
nature, justice is inter-temporal and must 
embrace all life found in the Earth’s 
biosphere.  
 
Acknowledgement of this is the biological 
imperative. 
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